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ABSTRACT 
 
As one of the solutions to intrusion detection problems, Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) 
have shown their advantages. Unlike genetic algorithms, there is no one archetypal AIS, 
instead there are four major paradigms. Among them, the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) 
has produced promising results in various applications. The aim of this chapter is to 
demonstrate the potential for the DCA as a suitable candidate for intrusion detection 
problems. We review some of the commonly used AIS paradigms for intrusion detection 
problems and demonstrate the advantages of one particular algorithm, the DCA. In order to 
clearly describe the algorithm, the background to its development and a formal definition are 
given. In addition, improvements to the original DCA are presented and their implications are 
discussed, including previous work done on an online analysis component with segmentation 
and ongoing work on automated data preprocessing. Based on preliminary results, both 
improvements appear to be promising for online anomaly-based intrusion detection.  
 
Key Terms: Artificial Immune Systems, Dendritic Cell Algorithm, Danger Theory, Intrusion 
Detection, Botnet, Signal, Antigen, Deterministic DCA, Negative Selection, Segmentation, 
Correlation Coefficient, Information Gain, Principal Component Analysis.              
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) (de Castro and Timmis, 2003) are computer systems 
inspired by both theoretical immunology and observed immune functions, principles and 
models, which are applied to real world problems. The human immune system, from which 
AIS draw inspiration, is evolved to protect the host from a wealth of invading 
microorganisms. AIS are developed to provide the similar defensive properties within a 
computing context. Initially AIS were based on simple models of the human immune system. 
As noted by Stibor et al. (2005), “first generation algorithms”, including negative selection 
and clonal selection do not produce the same high quality performance as the human immune 
system. These algorithms, negative selection in particular, are prone to problems with scaling 
and the generation of excessive false alarms when used to solve problems such as network 
based intrusion detection. Recent AIS use more rigourous and up-to-date immunology and 
are developed in collaboration with modellers and immunologists. The resulting algorithms 
are believed to encapsulate the desirable properties of immune systems including robustness, 
error tolerance, and self-organisation (de Castro and Timmis, 2003). 
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One such “second generation” AIS is the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) (Greensmith, 
2007), inspired by the function of the dendritic cells (DCs) of the innate immune system. It 
incorporates the principles of a key novel theory in immunology, termed the “danger theory” 
(Matzinger, 2002). This theory suggests that DCs are responsible for the initial detection of 
invading microorganisms, in addition to the induction of various immune responses against 
such invaders. An abstract model of natural DC behaviour is used as the foundation of the 
developed algorithm. The DCA has been successfully applied to numerous computer security 
related, more specific, intrusion detection problems, including port scan detection 
(Greensmith, 2007), botnet detection (Al-Hammadi et al., 2008) and a classifier for robot 
security (Oates et al., 2007). According to the results, the DCA has shown not only good 
performance in terms of detection rate, but also the ability to reduce the rate of false alarms in 
comparison to other systems, including Self Organising Maps (SOM) (Greensmith et al., 
2008).  
The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the reason for why the DCA is a suitable 
candidate for intrusion detection problems. In order to clearly describe the algorithm, the 
background and a formal definition are given. In addition, improvements to the original DCA 
are presented and their implications are discussed. The chapter is organised as follows: 
firstly, background information about a series of well known AIS algorithms and intrusion 
detection are described in section 2; secondly, several population AIS approaches for 
intrusion detection are introduced in section 3; thirdly, the algorithm details and formal 
definition of the DCA are demonstrated in section 4; fourthly, issues with the current DCA 
and potential solutions are discussed in section 5; finally, a summary of the work and some 
future directions are given in section 6.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Intrusion Detection 
 
Intrusion detection involves the detection of any disallowed activities in networked computer 
systems. Based on deployment, intrusion detection systems can be grouped into either host-
based or network-based. Host-based intrusion detection refers to the systems that monitor and 
collect data from the host machine. Data can be log files that include system information, 
such as CPU usage, memory usage, incoming/outgoing network traffics, and information of 
processes that are running on the host. Conversely, network-based intrusion detection refers 
to the systems that monitor and collect network traffic data among multiple hosts that are 
required for protection. Each host is a source of monitoring and collecting data, termed 
‘sensor’. Generally, network traffic is represented by network packets, which contain 
information of communications between the sources and destinations, such as IP address, 
port, service etc. Nowadays, most intrusion detection systems are hybrids of host-based and 
network-based deployments (Bejtlich, 2005).  
Another way of categorising intrusion detection systems is based on detection methods, 
namely signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection (NIST, 2001). Signature-
based detection, also known as misuse detection, distinguishes an intruder by comparing 
patterns or signatures of the intruder with previously known intrusions. As soon as any 
matches occur, an alarm is triggered. Whereas, anomaly-based detection involves 
discriminating between normal and anomalous data, based on the knowledge of the normal 
data. Thus, firstly the system needs to generate profiles of normality by either training or 
statistical analysis. During detection, anything that deviates from the normal profile is 
classified as anomalous, and an alarm is launched. Both signature based and anomaly based 
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detection have different strengths and weaknesses. Signature-based detection produces high 
detection rate and low rate of false alarms, but it can only recognise the intruders or attacks 
are previously seen. Anomaly-based detection is capable of novel intruders and attacks that 
have not been seen before, but it encounter the problem of generating relatively high rate of 
false alarms. This problem stems from the way in which normal profiles are generated, as in 
most cases the collected data are just a small sample and thus not representative of the whole 
problem. Current techniques are often unable to cope with the dynamic changes of normal 
profile in real world problems and complex systems, such as large computer networks in 
which massive amount of nodes and uncertainties are presented.   
 
AIS Algorithms 
 
AIS researchers believe that AIS are intended to perform similar functions to the natural 
immune, such as defence and maintenance of the host, in a computational context. Unlike 
genetic algorithms, there is no one archetypal AIS, instead there are four major AIS 
paradigms, including the Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) (Hofmeyr &Forrest, 1999), 
the Clonal Selection Algorithm (CSA) (de Castro &Von Zuben, 2000), the algorithms based 
on idiotypic networks models (Hart & Timmis, 2008), and the Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
(DCA) (Greensmith, 2007). These algorithms map the defence function of the immune 
system, in which certain immune entities and their functions or behaviour are included. 
Commonly seen immune entities are antigens which are protein particles recognised by the 
immune system, immune cells that perform certain immune functions individually or 
collaboratively, and antibodies that are detectors capable of recognising and binding to 
antigens. These algorithms generally involve generating effective detectors that can recognise 
the invading intruders and induce reactions against potential threats.  
 
The NSA are inspired by the behaviour of a population of immune cells, named “T-cells”, 
which belong to the adaptive immune system. In order to become functional, natural T-cells 
undergo “negative selection” for maturation in the thymus. First of all, the immune system 
generates a population of naive T cells with random specificity. Any naive T-cells that are 
reactive to self components are then removed from the population during this process. 
Remaining T-cells should only react to non-self substances, which according self/non-self 
theory (Coico et al., 2003) are threats to the host. From an algorithmic point view, the NSA 
has the following steps:  
1. The system initialises certain amount of random detectors, named “naive detectors”; 
2. The system generates a self set from the training data that only contains normal data 
instances; 
3. The naive detectors are compared with the self set, to produce a population of 
detectors that only react to intruders, termed “mature detectors”; 
4. The data instances in the testing data are compared with each mature detector, and if 
any detector reacts to the incoming data instance, an alarm is triggered.  
Comparisons in training and testing (detection) are accomplished by certain matching 
functions, to assess the affinity of two compared candidates, where an activation threshold is 
applied.  
 
The CSA are based on Burnett’s theory of clonal selection and immune memory (Coico et al., 
2003). This includes several adaptive and learning processes. It involves another population 
of immune cells, named “B-cells”, which produce antibodies capable of detecting diverse and 
numerous patterns of invading threats.  Immune memory is composed of “memory cells” that 
are able to remember the previously seen threats. The procedures of the CSA are as follows:  
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1. The system initialises certain amount of random solutions to a given problem; 
2. These solutions are then being exposed to training; 
3. In each generation, the best solutions are selected based on a affinity measure, to 
reproduce with multiple clones; 
4. Current solutions then undergo a mutation process with high frequency, which is 
proportional to the affinity measure;  
5. Optimal solutions are selected in the current population, to form memory cells; 
6. The steps above keep repeating until a termination point is reached. 
In brief, the system also uses pattern recognition mechanism for information processing, to 
make decisions of selecting the optimal solutions. The probability of a solution being 
replaced is proportional to its goodness. The better a solution is, the more clones are 
reproduced. As a result, majority of the population are optimal solutions.  
 
Idiotypic network based algorithms are derived from the immune network theory proposed by 
Jerne (Jerne, 1974). It suggests that the immune system can be seen as a network in which 
immune entities interact with each other even when antigens are absent. The interactions can 
be initialised not only between antigens and antibodies, but also between antibodies and 
antibodies. This induces either stimulating or suppressive immune responses. They result a 
series of immunological behaviours, including tolerance and memory emergence. There are 
three major factors that affect the stimulation level of B-cells (Timmis et al., 2008), which are 
the contribution of the antigen binding, the contribution of neighbouring B-cells, and the 
suppression of neighbouring B-cells. As the stimulation level of a B-cells increases, the 
amount of clones it produces increases accordingly. At the population level, this results a 
diverse set of B-cells. In addition, three mutation mechanisms are introduced, including 
crossover, inverse and point mutation. In principle, the idiotypic network based algorithms 
are similar to the CSA, apart from the interactions between solutions in the repertoire, which 
may result a higher convergence rate.   
 
APPLICATIONS OF AIS TO INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
Since AIS are designed though mimicking certain properties of the natural immune system, 
especially the detection mechanism for intruders, obvious applications of AIS can be 
intrusion detection problems (Kim et al., 2007). However, not all AIS paradigms are 
applicable, majority of the applications involve the NSA, the idiotypic network based 
algorithms and the DCA. In this sections, a number of noticeable applications are described.   
 
The NSA-based Approaches 
 
Initial development of an NSA based intrusion detection system was by Hofmeyr et al. 
(1999). The system aimed to solve problems that involve detecting malicious connections 
between one computer in the Local Area Network (LAN) and one external computer. 
Connections are represented as 49-bit binary strings that include the source IP, destination IP, 
source port, destination port and service type etc. Detection is performed through string 
matching between connection string s and detector string d, using r-contiguous bits rule (if s 
and d have the same symbols in at least r contiguous bits positions). The value r is a 
threshold that determines the specificity of a detector. The system has a training phase where 
negative selection mechanism is used. Later on, a real-valued NSA was proposed by 
González & Dasgupta (2003), in which data representation is changed from binary strings to 
real-valued numbers. The use of such data representation was intended to speed up detector 
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generation process.  
As pointed out in (Stibor et al., 2005), the NSA (no matter binary string version or real-
valued version) have numerous problems: firstly they cannot avoid the curse of 
dimensionality, and not applicable to data with high dimensionality; secondly, the detector 
generation can result holes within the shape-space, so it is difficult to cover just non-self, and 
it either generates the population of detectors covering both non-self and unseen self (over-
fit) or only covering partial non-self (under-fit); thirdly, the NSA still take extensive time 
period to generate the adequately complete set of detectors. Therefore, negative selection is 
insufficient and not suitable for anomaly detection. 
 
The Idiotypic Network Approach 
 
Ostaszewski et al (2008) proposed an adaptive and dynamic intrusion detection system based 
on idiotypic network. This system was designed mainly for the detection of a special type of 
attacks, namely “denial of service” (DOS). The DAPRA 1999 dataset (MIT Lincoln Lab, 
1998 ) was used to test the system. As the aim was to provide comprehensive information of 
network behaviour, rather than raise alarms whenever inappropriate activities are identified, 
the evaluation of system performance also considered the amount of information generated 
during usual events. 
The proposed system provides a means of gathering information about incoming, or 
proceeding attack from the very beginning, to take efficient countermeasures against threats. 
According to the experiments, monitoring activities of the idiotypic network helped to 
identify DOS attacks in the tested data, and different kinds of attacks showed their own 
particular impacts on the system. In addition, extra information can be extracted from the 
idiotypic network to facilitate the identification of anomalies.  
 
The Danger Theory Approach 
 
The DCA was developed to overcome the problems shown with the NSA. It was initially 
proposed and developed by Greensmith et al. (2005) where it was applied to a basic and 
standard machine learning dataset, the UCI Wisconsin Breast Cancer dataset (UCI). For this 
simple dataset, a classification accuracy of 99% was produced. The DCA was then applied to 
the ping scan detection (Greensmith et al., 2006) in computer security. The results showed 
that the algorithm could achieve 100% classification accuracy when appropriate thresholds 
are used. The DCA was later on applied to SYN scan detection (Greensmith & Aickelin, 
2007) where the collected dataset consists of over five million data instances. The detection 
scenario was that the SYN scan was launched from a victim machine, where the DCA is used 
to monitor the behaviours of the victim. This scenario represents a scan performed by an 
insider, who can be a legitimate user of the system doing unauthorised activities. The 
algorithm produced high true positive rate and low false positive rate, and each experiment 
could be finished within acceptable time despite the large quantity of data it needs to process. 
 
The DCA was also applied to Botnet detection (Al-Hammadi et al., 2008). Botnets are 
decentralised and distributed networks of subverted machines, controlled by a central 
commander, namely “botmaster”. A single bot is a malicious piece of program that can 
transfer victim machines into zombie machines once installed. This work demonstrated the 
application of the DCA to the detection of a single bot, to assess its performance on this novel 
problem area. The results indicated that the DCA was able to distinguish the bot from the 
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normal processes on a host machine. The DCA was then applied to a benchmark intrusion 
detection dataset (Gu et al., 2008), KDD Cup 1999 (Hettich & Bay, 1999).  KDD 99 has been 
widely used and understood, and it is one of the only few labelled datasets that are publicly 
available in the field of intrusion detection. A preliminary comparison is performed, among 
the DCA, the real-valued NSA with constant detectors and the C4.5 decision tree algorithm. 
The results show that the DCA produces reasonably good performance compared to others.  
 
The applications of the DCA indicate the strengths of the algorithm as follows: firstly, the 
DCA does not require a training phase and the knowledge of normality and anomaly is 
acquired through basic statistical analysis, so the applications may be less time consuming 
than other supervised learning algorithms; secondly, the DCA performs linear calculations for 
its computation, making the system low weight and ideally for intrusion detection tasks. Both 
strengths make the DCA a suitable candidate for intrusion detection tasks, which mainly 
require high detection speed. 
 
In summary, the DCA has shown reasonable detection accuracy in the past applications, and 
it has the advantage of not having a training phase shortening the application process and low 
weight in computation improving detection speed. As a result, if one needs a system such that 
a high requirement of detection speed is more crucial, the DCA can be a suitable solution.   
 
THE DENDRITIC CELL ALGORITHM 
 
The DCA is a population-based algorithm, designed for tackling anomaly-based detection 
tasks. It is inspired by functions of natural DCs of the innate immune system, which form part 
of the body's first line of defence against invaders. DCs have the ability to combine a 
multitude of molecular information and to interpret this information for the T-cells of the 
adaptive immune system, to induce appropriate immune responses towards perceived threats. 
Therefore, DCs can be seen as detectors for different policing sites of the body as well as 
mediators for inducing a variety of immune responses.  
 
Algorithm Overview 
 
Signal and antigen are two types of molecular information processed by natural DCs. Signals 
are collected by DCs from their local environment and consist of indicators of the health of 
the monitored tissue. DCs exist in one of three states of maturation to throughout their 
lifespans. In the initial immature state, DCs are exposed to a combination of signals. Based 
on the concentration of various signals, DCs can differentiate into either a “fully mature” 
form to activate the adaptive immune system, or a “semi-mature” form to suppress it. During 
their immature phase DCs also collect debris in the tissue which are subsequently combined 
with the environmental signals. Some of the “suspicious” debris collected are termed 
antigens, and they are proteins originating from potential invading entities. DCs combine the 
“suspect” antigens with evidence in the form of processed signals to correctly instruct the 
adaptive immune system to respond, or become tolerant to the antigens in question. For more 
information regarding the underlying biological mechanisms, please refer to (Greensmith, 
2007 and Lutz and Schuler, 2002). 
The DCA incorporates the functionality of DCs including data fusion, state differentiation 
and information temporal correlation. For the remainder of the chapter the term “DC” will 
refer to the artificial agent based cell, not the natural DCs. For the DCs in the DCA, as per the 
natural system, there are two types of input data, signal and antigen. Signals are represented 
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as vectors of real-valued numbers, which are measures of the monitored system's status 
within certain time periods. We term this information as “system context” data. Antigens are 
categorical values that can be various states of a problem domain or the entities of interest 
associated with a monitored system. In real world applications, antigens represent what to be 
classified within a problem domain. For example, they can be process IDs in computer 
security problems (Al-Hammadi et al., 2008, Greensmith and Aickelin, 2007), a small range 
of positions and orientations of robots (Oates et al., 2007), the proximity sensors of online 
robotic systems (mokhtar2009), or the time stamps of records collected in biometric datasets 
(Gu et al., 2009). Signals represent system context of a host or a measure of network traffic 
(Al-Hammadi et al., 2008, Greensmith and Aickelin, 2007), measurements derived from 
various sensors in robotic systems (Oates et al., 2007, Mokhtar et al., 2009), or the biometric 
data captured from a monitored automobile driver (Gu et al., 2009). Signals are normally pre-
categorised as “PAMP”, “Danger” or “Safe” in the DCA. The semantics of these signal 
categories is listed as follows. 
• PAMP: a measure that increases in value as the observation of anomalous behaviour. 
It is a confident indicator of anomaly, which usually presented as signatures of the 
events that can definitely cause damage to the system. 
• Danger: a measure indicates a potential abnormality. The value increases as the 
confidence of the monitored system being in abnormal status increases accordingly.  
• Safe: a measure that increases value in conjunction with observed normal behaviour. 
This is a confident indicator of normal, predictable or steady-state system behaviour.  
Increases in the safe signal value suppress the effects of the PAMP and danger signals within 
the algorithm, as per what is observed in the natural system. This immunological property has 
been incorporated within the DCA in the form of predefined weights for each signal category, 
for the transformation from input signals to output signals. The output signals are used to 
evaluate the status of the monitored system, to determine the presence of anomalies or 
misbehaviours.  
A relationship of cause-and-effect is believed to exist between signals and antigens, where 
signals are the explicit effects that potentially result from the implicit cause of antigens. This 
is achieved if the input data is correctly mapped to the underlying problem domain. The goal 
of the DCA is to incorporate such a relationship to identify antigens that are responsible for 
the anomalies reflected by signals. Therefore, the algorithm operates in two steps, firstly it 
identifies whether anomalies occurred in the past based on the input data; secondly it 
correlates the identified anomalies with the potential causes, generating an anomaly scene per 
suspect.  
This is achieved by deploying a population of artificial cells, DC objects, which operate in 
parallel as detectors. Diversity is generated within the DC population through the application 
of lifespans, which limit the amount of information an individual DC object can process. 
Different DCs are given different limits for their lifespan, which creates a variable time 
window effect, with different DC objects processing the signal and antigen data sources 
during different time periods across the analysed time series (Oates et al., 2008). It is 
postulated that the combination of signal/antigen temporal correlation and diversity of the DC 
population are responsible for the detection capability of the DCA. 
 
Development Pathway 
 
In this section a brief history is given of the development of the DCA and the numerous 
versions that have appeared over the past few years. An overview of this process is given in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Development pathway of the DCA. 
 
 
Following the development of the initial abstract model the applicability of the DCA was first 
demonstrated in a prototype system (pDCA) (Greensmith, 2007). Here the pDCA was applied 
to a binary classification problem which demonstrated this population based algorithm was 
capable of performing two-class discrimination on an ordered dataset, using a timestamp as 
antigen and a combination of features forming three signal categories.  
After the encouraging results achieved, the pDCA was further developed into a larger system, 
combined with the immune-inspired agent based framework libtissue.  This version (ltDCA) 
was stochastic in nature and contained numerous somewhat unpredictable elements including 
random sampling of incoming antigen, signal decay and randomly assigned migration 
thresholds. While ltDCA yielded positive results in a number of applications, it contained too 
many arbitrary and random components, rendering detailed study of its behaviour as an 
algorithm almost infeasible.  Initially the ltDCA was applied to problems in computer and 
network security including port scan detection and sensor network security. 
In parallel to the development of ltDCA, this algorithm steadily increased in popularity 
especially within the AIS community, being applied to a range of problems. This includes its 
use as a robotic classifier for physical security. To adapt the ltDCA for purpose, to obtain a 
reasonable mapping of signal and antigen data, a number of modifications were made, 
including the segmentation of the output information to provide localisation information for a 
detected anomaly and the integration of a re-implemented ltDCA with a Brookes style 
‘subsumption architecture’. This experiment in effect validated the use of the DCA as an 
anomaly detection technique and transformed its analysis stage into an online process. 
Despite its successful application in a number of problem domains, several issues arose in 
particular with understanding the nature of the "signal and antigen" model of input, and how 
to interface the categories with given input data. Definitions for the data streams, initially 
heavily reliant on biological metaphors, were never sufficiently clear and the stochastic 
nature of ltDCA exacerbated this problem. Theoretical analysis implied that the ltDCA was 
simply an ensemble linear classifier, which contradicted some of the claims made previously 
about the manner by which the ltDCA functions. 
In response to this, a large amount of randomness was removed from the algorithm and a 
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simplified version developed, named the deterministic DCA (dDCA). This DCA variant is 
predictable in its use; one can follow a single antigen element throughout the system, and 
given a priori knowledge of the signals used and the antigen's relative position to all other 
antigen it is possible to predict its classification. It is shown that the dDCA does not have 
impaired performance in comparison to ltDCA, and it is possible to calculate crucial 
algorithmic information such as its real-time capability and run-time complexity values.  
Still, the dDCA does not avoid the problems that accompany its interface to underlying 
datasets, nor does it solve the problem of having a non-adaptive analysis module. We propose 
that ultimately it is necessary to develop an integrated DCA (iDCA) which can automatically 
extract and select relevant components of underlying data and can adapt to appropriately 
produce anomaly discrimination in real time and adapt to changes in the underlying dataset. 
The difference in the dDCA in comparison to a hypothetical iDCA are numerous, therefore 
we propose to initially develop an intermediate version extended from the dDCA, termed 
xDCA which is described and used in this paper. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DCA 
 
Recently a series of improvements to the original DCA have been made, to respond to some 
of the criticisms. Firstly, a formal definition of the DCA is given to avoid the potential 
ambiguities of the algorithm. Secondly, an online analysis component based segmentation 
approaches is introduced to enable periodic and continuous analysis. Thirdly, automated data 
preprocessing methods based on dimensionality reduction and statistical inference techniques 
for automated signal selection and categorisation. 
 
Formalisation of the Algorithm 
 
One criticism of the DCA is the lack of a formal definition, which results in ambiguity for 
understanding the algorithm and thus leads to incorrect applications and implementations. A 
formal definition of the DCA should be provided for clearly presenting the algorithm. In this 
section, we define data structures of the DCA and formalise the algorithm. We concentrate on 
specifying the entire DC population using quantitative measures at the functional level, and 
basic set theory and computational functions such as addition, multiplication and recursion 
are used for clarity.  
 
Data Structures 
 
Define Signal ⊆ R3  and Antigen ⊆ N  to be the two types of input data. Within a time period 
( Time ⊆ R), the input data can be defined as S : Time →Signal ∪ Antigen, and S(t) is an 
instance of input data where t ∈Time . Elements of Signal  are corresponding to three signal 
categories of the DCA as mentioned, which are represented as three-dimensional (3D) 
vectors and usually normalised into a predefined nonnegative range. Elements of Antigen 
are categorical values, represented as natural numbers where ordering is ignored.  
Define the weight matrix of signal transformation as W , a matrix with two rows and three 
columns, where wij ∈R. The weight matrix is used to transform three categories of input 
signal to two categories output signals. It is usually predefined by users, and kept constant 
during runtime. The entries are based on empirical results from the underlying immunology.  
We use the notation List(A) for a list of type A . Let Population be a set of DC objects and 
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N = Population  be the population size, a DC object consists of: 
• a unique index i ∈ 1,2,...,N{ }; 
• a lifespan I : Population →R; 
• an initial value of its signal profile K : Population →R, which is equal to zero; 
• a list List(Antigen) for storing its antigen profile. 
The signal profile is a measure of processed signal instances, whereas the antigen profile is a 
measure of sampled antigen instances. Each DC object is able to update its internal data 
structures by calling relevant operations. 
The output of each DC is stored in a list of N × R. We use lst( j)  to denote the jth element of 
lst, and pi1 and pi2 for projection functions to get the first and second dimension of a 2-D 
vector respectively. 
 
Procedural Operations 
 
To access the data structures of the DCA, a series of procedural operations are called. These 
procedural operations describe behaviours of the algorithm at the functional level. They are 
the most fundamental elements of the algorithm, each of which is executed in one step. The 
aim of formalising these operations is to present them as simple and clear as possible without 
losing details. 
Let Append(x,X)  be a generic function of appending an element x  (2-D vector) to a list X  
(a list of 2-D vectors). The type of x  determines the type of X , they can be N × R or R × R. 
It is different from “unite” of sets, as duplicates are not eliminated. The function operates by 
appending the new element to the current list, so it is executed in one step. 
At the beginning ( t = 0), the algorithm initialises all DC objects in Population by assigning 
the initial values of I(i)  and K(i) , namely “DC initialisation”. The value of I(i)  depends on 
the density function used to generate the initial lifespan of each DC object. Both uniform 
distribution and Gaussian distribution can be applied.  
Definition 1 (signal transformation). The signal transformation function is defined as 
O : Time →R × R . 
O(t) = S(t) • W
T
, S(t) ∈Signal;
Null, otherwise,
 
 
 
 
where •  is a multiplication operator for two matrixes. This operation is executed whenever 
S(t) ∈Signal  holds, and it performs a multiplication between a 3-D vector and a transposed 
2 × 3 matrix to produce another 2-D vector, which consists of two output signals, namely 
“CSM” and “K”. In the case that S(t) ∈Antigen holds, the function returns Null . 
Definition 2 (lifespan update). The lifespan update function is defined as 
F : Time × Population →R. 
F(t,i) =
I(i), t = 0;
I(i) − pi1(O(t)), F(t −1,i) ≤ 0;
F(t −1,i) − pi1(O(t)), otherwise.
 
 
 
 
 
 
When t = 0, the initial value of F  is I(i)  which is the initial lifespan of a DC object. It is 
repeatedly subtracted by CSM signal until the termination condition, F(t −1,i) ≤ 0, is 
reached, and then it is reset to its initial value I(i) . 
Definition 3 (signal profile update). The signal profile update function is defines as 
G : Time × Population →R. 
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G(t,i) =
K(i), t = 0;
K(i) + pi2(O(t)), F(t −1,i) ≤ 0;
G(t −1,i) + pi2(O(t)), otherwise.
 
 
 
 
 
 
When t = 0, the value of G is K(i) = 0 which is the initial signal profile of a DC object. It is 
repeated added by k signal the termination condition is reached, and the it is reset to its initial 
value K(i) = 0. 
Definition 4 (antigen profile update). The antigen profile update function is defined as 
H : Time × Population →List(Antigen) . 
H(t,i) = Append(S(t),H(t −1,i)), S(t) ∈ Antigen;
Null, otherwise.
 
 
 
 
Initially H  is empty, and when a new antigen instance arrives, it is sampled by a DC object 
and stored into its list until the termination condition is reached. The index of the DC object 
selected is defined as i ≡ θ(modN) , where θ  is the number of antigen instances up to time t . 
This is termed the “sequential sampling” rule. 
Definition 5 (output record). Let R(t,i) = {(r,a) r = G(t,i) ∧ a ∈ H(t,i)}  be the output of a DC 
object, and the output record function is defined as 
(F(t,i) ≤ 0) ∧ (t > 0) ⇒ Append(R(t,i),lst) . 
Where r  is the signal profile and a  is the antigen profile recorded by a DC object. This 
function is responsible for appending the output of a DC object (a 2-D vector) into the output 
list lst when the termination condition is reached. The processed information in lst is used to 
produce the final detection results in the analysis phase. 
Definition 6 (antigen counter). The antigen counter function for each antigen type 
α ∈Antigen is defined as C : N × N →{0,1} . 
C( j,α) = 1, pi1(lst( j)) = α;
0, otherwise.
 
 
 
 
Definition 7 (signal profile abstraction). The signal profile abstraction function is defined as 
R : N × N →R. 
R( j,α) = pi 2(lst( j)), pi1(lst( j)) = α;
0, otherwise.
 
 
 
 
Function C  counts the number of instances of antigen type α , and function R calculates the 
sum of all k values associated with antigen type α . These two operations are performed for 
every single antigen type, and involve scanning lst in its entirety.  
Definition 8 (anomaly metric calculation). The anomaly metric calculation function of K(α)  
is defined as. 
β = C( j,α)
j =0
n −1
∑ ∧ γ = R( j,α)
j =0
n −1
∑
⇒ K(α) = γβ
 
As α  is a known antigen type, we have β ≥1. A threshold can be applied for further 
classification. The value of the threshold depends on the underlying characteristics of the 
dataset used. If K(α)  is greater than the predefined threshold, it is classified as anomalous, 
other normal.  
The procedural operations of the DCA are formally defined in previous section, so by 
combining them with for or while loops and if statements the algorithm can be presented as 
the following Pseudocode.  
foreach DC object do 
 DC initilisation; 
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end 
while input data do 
 if antigen then 
  antigen profile update; 
 end 
 if signal then 
  signal transformation; 
  foreach DC object do 
   lifespan update; 
   signal profile update; 
   if termination condition then 
    output record; 
end 
  end 
 end 
end 
while ouput list do 
 foreach antigen type do 
  antigen counter; 
  signal profile abstraction; 
  anomaly metric cacluation; 
 end 
end 
 
Online Analysis Component 
 
An online analysis component is essential for developing an effective intrusion detection 
system using the DCA. Such a component performs periodic analysis of the processed 
information presented by DCs, to continuously identify intrusions during detection. An 
effective and fully functioning intrusion detection system should be able to identify the 
intrusions as quickly as possible, as accurately as possible, and hence detection speed and 
detection accuracy are two major indicators of performance. By detection speed here we 
meant the time an intrusion detection system takes to identify intrusions or anomalies during 
detection. Most techniques can produce reasonable detection accuracy, if sufficient time is 
given. But in most case detection speed is more significant for assessing the performance of 
an intrusion detection system. If the system fails to identify the intrusions in time, no further 
responses against the intrusions can be made. This leads to the eventual success of attacks, 
which is a fatal failure of an intrusion detection system. In other words, if the intrusions are 
identified too late, even with 100% detection accuracy, it all becomes meaningless in terms of 
system defence. As a result, we propose integrating online analysis with the DCA, to improve 
detection speed without compromising detection accuracy. 
If online analysis is to be performed during detection, one issue needs resolved, namely, 
when to perform analysis. This could be solved by introducing segmentation to the DCA. It is 
different from the moving time windows method described in (Gu et al., 2008), which is used 
in the pre-processing stage to smooth noisy input signals, as segmentation is performed in the 
post-processing stage for the purpose of periodic and continuous analysis. As the processed 
information is presented by matured DCs over time, a sequence of processed information is 
being generated during detection. Segmentation involves partitioning this sequence into 
relative smaller segments, in terms of the number of data items or time. All the generated 
segments have the same size, and the analysis is performed within each individual segment. 
Therefore, in each segment, one set of detection result ( K(α)  per antigen type) is generated, 
in which intrusions appeared within the duration of this segment can be identified.  
First of all, segmentation can produce multiple sets of results, rather than one set of results 
produced by non-segmentation system. This enables the system to perform analysis online 
not offline, as all segments are processed during detection. In addition, segmentation 
distributes the analysis process into multiple steps, instead of performing at once. This can 
reduce the computation power and time required for the analysis process, so segmentation 
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can effectively enhance detection speed. Moreover, as the processed information is presented 
by matured DCs at different time points over the duration, analysing the sequence of 
processed information at once ignores the temporal difference of each piece of processed 
information. As a result, the same antigen type that causes malicious activities at one point 
but does nothing at another point may be classified as normal rather than an intrusion. This 
can be avoided by applying segmentation, as it features periodic analysis that can cope with 
the inherited time differences. Therefore, the system can effectively discriminate malicious 
activities from normal ones, and hence the detection accuracy can also be improved.         
The most important and in fact the only factor of segmentation is the segment size. It 
determines how soon the intrusions can be identified. The smaller the segment size, the 
sooner the intrusions can be identified, and vice versa. Moreover, the segment size may also 
influence the sensitivity of the final results. If the segment size is too large, the results can 
lose the sensitivity and thus the system loses the ability to identify true positives. However, if 
the segment size is too small, the results may be too sensitive, and the system can generate 
false positives.  
In (Gu et al., 2009), the authors have shown that applying segmentation to the DCA makes 
significant differences to the results. In some cases, the system with segmentation may even 
produce better performance in terms of detection accuracy. In addition, segmentation enables 
the system to perform periodic analysis on the processed information presented by the DCs. 
As a result it can effectively improve detection speed without compromising detection 
accuracy. Therefore, segmentation is applicable to the DCA. Even though segmentation is not 
immune inspired, it can still make contribution to the field of AIS, as it can improve the 
system performance of the DCA. As a result, more effective intrusion detection systems can 
be developed, by integrating segmentation with the DCA. This method is also applicable to 
other second generation AIS algorithms. 
 
Automated Data Preprocessing 
 
The DCA encounters issues that accompany its interface to underlying datasets, as well as 
have a non-adaptive analysis module. Formal definition and theoretical analysis have shown 
that the algorithm itself is rather simple, and segmentation enables the DCA to efficiently and 
effectively process large datasets in terms of data size. However, data size is not the only 
concern when handling complex datasets, high dimensionality is often a bigger problem. 
Complexity occurs at the data pre-processing stage of the DCA when dimensionality 
reduction is required. Previously, the data pre-processing of the DCA is performed manually 
based on users' expert knowledge of a given problem domain, which is time consuming and 
sometime difficult to achieve. As a result, it is necessary to automate the data pre-processing 
stage, which extracts and selects relevant features, and adapts the algorithm to characteristics 
of the underlying data. 
Originally the DCA does not rely on training data to define which of the input signals are 
potentially “dangerous”. But expert knowledge of the problem domain is required to generate 
proper input data to the DCA during manual data pre-processing. It involves two steps, 
namely “antigen representation” and “signal selection and categorisation” for generating two 
types of input to the DCA. Since antigen representation involves identifying the objects to 
classify as normal or anomalous in the problem, it is usually easy to accomplish and thus 
does not require automation. The rest of this section is focused on the automation of signal 
selection and categorisation in the DCA. 
Signal selection and categorisation involve firstly selecting or extracting the most interesting 
features from the original feature set of a given dataset, and then categorising these features 
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into one of three signal categories of the DCA. Manual methods are problematic, as whenever 
the problem is changed, the whole process needs to be redone. Even for the same dataset, if 
cross-validation is used, the process needs to be performed for every single subset generated. 
In addition, it is not always possible to acquire adequate expert knowledge for a dataset to 
effectively perform signal selection and categorisation for the DCA. In order to automate 
signal selection and categorisation, techniques of dimensionality reduction and statistical 
inference are used, and an unsupervised “training phase” is introduced to obtain the 
underlying knowledge regarding normality and anomaly of a problem.  
Let X = {x1 ,x2 ,...,xm}  the original feature set of a problem. Dimensionality reduction 
involves generating a new feature space Y = {y1,y 2,...,yd }  ( d < m ), which is supposed to be 
representative of the problem with minimum redundancy. Feature selection involves selecting 
a best subset of input features. Feature extraction creates new features based on 
transformations or combinations of the original features. The choice between feature 
selection and extraction depends on the problem domain and classifier. The possible 
techniques are listed as follows. 
• Correlation Coefficient (with class labels) - feature selection 
• Information Gain (with class labels) - feature selection 
• Principal Component Analysis (PCA, without class labels) - feature extraction 
Preliminary work has been carried out in Gu et al. (2009), in which the authors showed that it 
was possible to integrate PCA with the DCA for the purpose of automated data 
preprocessing. The PCA facilitateed the reduction of data dimension of the raw data, to select 
proper features as the candidates of the input of the DCA. It was also used for the ranking of 
attributes based on the variability, which is mapped to the ranking of signal categories of the 
DCA for signal categorisation. In this way, the data preprocessing of the DCA is performed 
by simply using PCA and basic Min-Max normalisation, without the requirement of any 
expert knowledge of the problem domain. The results suggested that the integrated system of 
PCA and the DCA was successful in terms of anomaly detection, as the system can produce 
relatively high true positive rates and low false positive rates. As a result, the application of 
PCA to the DCA makes it possible to automatically categorise input data into user-defined 
signal categories, while still generating useful and accurate classification results. 
More recently, automated data preprocessing methods based on feature selection/extraction 
and statistical inference techniques are developed. The idea is to use dimensionality reduction 
techniques to select the most interesting features from the original feature set as the 
candidates of input signals to the DCA, then perform greed search to find the best 
combination of these candidates corresponding to the signals categories where mean square 
errors (MSE) (Garthwaite et al., 2006) is employed as a performance measure. The new 
system is tested by a number of datasets, as well as compared with other existing machine 
learning techniques. The testing datasets include: the UCI Wisconsin Breast Cancer dataset 
(Blake et al., 1998) consists of 700 data instances and each data item has 10 features; the 
KDD 99 dataset derived from the DAPRA 98 Lincoln Lab data set for applying data mining 
techniques to the area of intrusion detection, it consists of about 5 million data instances, each 
of which has 42 features. Two versions of the KDD 99 dataset are used: a 10% subset whose 
data items are randomly and proportionally selected from the whole dataset; and the whole 
dataset. As these two datasets are much more complicated, 10-fold cross validation is 
performed to generate 10 subsets. For the purpose of baseline comparison, other existing 
techniques, including K-Nearest-Neighbour (KNN), decision trees, and Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) algorithms are used. 
Table 1 shows the true positive rate and false positive rate of all methods applied to the breast 
cancer dataset. As expected, manual method produces high true positive rate and low false 
positive rate; PCA based method produces better result since its true positive rate is higher 
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and false positive rate is zero; information gain based method has significantly lower true 
positive rate but comparable false positive rate; correlation based method has comparable true 
positive rate but significantly higher false positive rate. 
 
Table 1. Results of all methods on the breast cancer dataset. 
 
 True Positive Rate False Positive Rate 
Manual 0.963 0.033 
PCA  0.985 0.000 
Information Gain 0.789 0.008 
Correlation 0.930 0.213 
 
As shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the manual method and other existing techniques produce 
good performance in terms of both true positive rate and false positive rate. Whereas, 
automated methods produce the results that vary from one subset to another. The PCA based 
method produces high true positive rate and low false positive rate for most subsets, except 
one where the true positive rate is significantly lower. The information gain based method 
produces true positive rates within a relatively large range but still all above the boundary of 
random classifier (50%), and it keeps the false positive rates at a low level. The correlation 
based method produces high true positive rates across, but simultaneously high false positive 
rates across all the subsets. The results show that it is possible to automate the data 
preprocessing of the DCA to produce useful. However, as this is work in progress, more 
investigation should be performed.   
 
Figure 2. Boxplot of true positive rates of all methods for KDD 10% dataset. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Boxplot of false positive rates of all methods for KDD 10% dataset. 
 
 16
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
In this book chapter, we reviewed some of the most popular AIS algorithms for intrusion 
detection problems, as well as demonstrating that the DCA is a suitable solution due to its 
unsupervised learning paradigm and low weight in computation. In order to present the DCA 
as simply and clearly as possible without losing detail, we used set theory and basic functions 
to formalise the algorithm. In addition, we demonstrated recent work for introducing an 
online analysis component to the DCA through segmentation, and the results indicate that the 
approach is promising especially for intrusion detection problems. Finally, ongoing work of 
automated data preprocessing of the DCA was described. With the automated data 
preprocessing, applications of the DCA are not dependent on the expert knowledge of the 
problem, and they become much less time consuming since manual procedures are replaced. 
Much of the work regarding the further development of the DCA is still ‘work in progress’. 
For example, only static segment sizes applied and tested for the online analysis component 
of the DCA, more adaptive mechanisms where segment size varies according the situations 
encountered during detection should be investigated. Additionally, only preliminary work has 
been performed for the automated data preprocessing of the DCA, more techniques of feature 
selection and feature extraction and more appropriate mechanisms for signal categorisation 
should be evaluated.  
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